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The aim of this paper is to test if electoral systems and human development are linked. 
Using high quality data and very simple panel data econometric techniques, we show that 
electoral systems play a critical role in explaining the difference in the levels of human 
development between countries. We f ind that countries which have proportional systems 
enjoy higher levels of human development than those with majoritarian  ones, thanks to 
more redistributive fiscal policies. We also find that when the degree of proportionality, 
based on electoral district size, increases, so does human development.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of human development is much wider than that of poverty which is directly 
related to income. It is based on the assumption that living a long and healthy life, with full 
access to education, is an indispensable complement to financial well-being. In addition, it 
also involves the recognition of the importance of economic, political and social liberties. 
Scholars have been interested in the latter concept since the basic needs approach was 
developed by the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Sen (1990), 
using a slightly different  approach, gave a new impetus to the study of welfare  by 
considering the importance of individual capacity, focusing on what a person really does as 
opposed to what he could do, given his idiosyncrasies.   As a result, in recent studies, 
welfare concepts are often privileged over that of poverty. The literature is also reaching a 
point where it is generally accepted that the success of a society  should be measured by 
how economic goals are translated into practical opportunities for the people, more than 
just some global growth rate of per capita income.  
The role of government spending in improving human development has been considered by 
many authors (among others  let us mention Strauss and Thomas, 1995). What generally 
emerges is that redistributive expenditures, such as social security and welfare spending, 
are efficient in the human development improvement strategy, while local public goods 
(such as pork barrel) have a very poor poverty reduction effect (Ranis and Stewart, 2000). 
What we want to show in this paper is that electoral systems influence the level of human 
development, through their effect on the breakdown of government spending: depending on 
the existing electoral system, politicians will choose the type of public expenditures they 
implement in function of the key groups of voters they want to target to maximize their   3 
probability of being reelected. Indeed, reelection is strongly dependent on the rules of the 
system, which politicians know perfectly well, and that define which electors they should 
try to attract. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) show, in the context of a Downsian model of electoral 
competition, that in larger districts, electoral competition will be diffused since parties will 
seek support from broad coalitions of voters. On the  contrary, in smaller districts, 
competition will be concentrated in locally geographically determined constituencies, 
towards which spending will be oriented. Under proportional representation (characterized 
by large electoral districts
1), politicians will favor broad redistributive policies, while under 
a majoritarian rule, they will favor local public goods spending.  A similar conclusion is 
reached in Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002). Extending the strategic delegation 
model of Chari, Jones and Marimon (1997), they show that in large electoral districts, 
legislators represent nationwide distributed socio-economic groups, targeting expenditures 
towards them. In small districts they represent locally determined groups and prefer to 
target expenditures locally. In addition, in single member districts, the objective is to win 
50% of the votes
2 in 50% of the districts.  On the other hand, u nder f ull proportional 
representation, a coalition of parties needs to win approximately 50% of the national vote, 
leading politicians to internalize the benefit for a larger share of the population. As shown 
by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), this will end in more redistributive programs in proportional 
representation and more local public good expenditures in majoritarian systems. Given that 
several authors have  proved the positive effect of redistributive spending on human 
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2 Or even less in the case of pure plurality systems.   4 
development, we expect proportional representation systems to be associated  with higher 
levels of human development than majoritarian ones. 
 
 
The structure of this paper is the following: after this short introduction, in the second 
section we briefly review the literature linking electoral systems and human development; 
in the third we present the methodology and the data we use and in the fourth we comment 
our main results. Finally, in the fifth section we conclude. 
 
2. Electoral Systems and Human Development 
 
Several authors have tried to identify which factors play an important role in explaining the 
differences in the level of human development between countries. Ramírez, Ranis, and 
Stewart (1999), show that economic growth is one of the most important features. Fields 
(1989), Deininger and Squire (1996) and Bruno et al. (1995) arrive at similar conclusions, 
adding that the reduction of poverty and human underdevelopment is dramatically linked to 
the level of income inequality.  Lipton (1977), Ranis (1979) and Stewart (1977) show that 
the type of economic growth is important as well, since a growth process associated with 
unemployment reduction and increasing rural income is much more efficient to reduce 
poverty than a growth process based on intensive capital and urban development. As far as 
government spending is concerned, Strauss and Thomas (1995), show how government 
spending  on social security
3 and welfare  affects human development  positively  using 
recently available micro-level data. It is thus extremely important to understand which 
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factors determine the breakdown of government expenditures in order to be able to enforce 
clear poverty reduction strategies. Our idea is that electoral systems have an effect on social 
security and welfare expenditures and thus on human development. The effect of electoral 
systems on redistributive spending has been  analyzed by several authors. Persson and 
Tabellini (1999), in a two-party electoral system model, show that small electoral districts 
(typical of majoritarian systems) are associated  with locally targeted expenditures since 
political competition is concentrated in geographically determined constituencies (districts) 
while large districts (typical of  proportional systems) are associated  with broad 
redistributive spending since parties seek the support of a wide coalition of voters. Milesi-
Ferretti et al. (2002) arrive at similar conclusions but with a different type of modeling. 
Starting from the assumption that elected politicians represent a specific locally determined 
group in small constituencies, while in large districts they represent large socio-economic 
groups, they show that in countries characterized by  a majoritarian electoral rule and by 
many small electoral districts, public expenditures will mainly be composed of local public 
goods,  while in proportional systems,  with few  large districts, they will be composed 
mainly of redistributive spending. Finally, in single member districts, the objective is to win 
50% of the votes
4 in 50% of the districts i.e. around 25% of the total vote may be sufficient, 
while u nder full proportional  representation, some coalition of parties needs to win 
approximately 50% of the national vote, leading politicians to internalize the benefit for a 
larger share of the population. As shown by Lizzeri and Persico (2001), this will result in 
more redistributive programs in proportional representation systems and more local public 
good expenditures in majoritarian ones. Given that local public goods such as pork barrel 
are not redistributive by nature, Verardi (2003) and Roland and Verardi (2005) suggest that 
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proportional systems should be associated with lower levels of  income inequality. Austen-
Smith (2002), considering a model with an exogenous political structure, arrives at a 
similar conclusion. He shows that  proportional systems are associated  with more 
redistributive taxes than  typical two-party majoritarian systems, i mplying less income 
inequality. A similar reasoning can be adopted here: given that proportional systems are 
associated with more redistributive spending  and given  that Strauss and Thomas (1995) 
have shown that redistributive spending reduces human  underdevelopment, we expect 
proportional  systems to be associated  with higher levels of human development than 
majoritarian ones. The scope of this paper is to test for this hypothesis. Before presenting 
the results in detail, it is important to clearly define our methodology and the data used. The 
following section does this after presenting some stylized facts. 
3. Data and Methodology  
A simple descriptive analysis is the first necessary step to test for a relation between human 
development, social security spending and electoral systems. Table I, which  presents the 
average human development index and the average level of social  security spending per 
year and by system, can  help to see if proportional democracies are  systematically 
associated with higher levels of human development and redistributive expenditures. Note 
that for this simple analysis, we decided to code a system as proportional if at least half of 
the representatives are elected by a proportional rule, and majoritarian otherwise. We will 
refine this naive measure further on. Social security spending is given as a percentage of 
GDP, as suggested by Persson and Tabellini (1999). 
[INSERT TABLE I HERE] 
From  Table I , we see that for all the years considered, both the levels of social security 
expenditures and human development are higher in proportional systems than   in   7 
majoritarian ones5. It is quite interesting to graph these features to get a better idea of the 
relation between the variables. This is done in figure 1, in which the human development 
indicator is on the vertical axis and social security spending is on the horizontal axis. The 
variables are presented for all the available years. As the type of electoral system is the 
main focus of our analysis, each observation is labeled with either prop (if the electoral 
system of the country corresponding to the observation is proportional) or maj (if  it is 
majoritarian). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The picture given by this figure is striking. First we see that a majority of the observations 
to the left of the figure correspond to majoritarian systems, while on the right they are 
mainly proportional. Furthermore, there is clearly a concave increasing relation between 
social security spending and human development. More precisely, it appears that, for these 
data, a logarithmic fit is probably much more appropriate than a linear one. These findings 
are interesting, but they are of course not sufficient to conclude anything and a much deeper 
analysis is needed. A first thing to do then, is to take a more precise measure of the degree 
of proportionality of a system than a simple dummy variable. Second, we need to consider 
control variables to avoid the omitted variable bias. Third, we need to work with a system 
of equations to test for both predicted effects simultaneously. Fourth, we should consider 
other dependent variables related to human development to see if our results stand. Finally, 
since the available data are not balanced between countries, we need to check if the results 
are not affected by awarding the same weight to all the data. We now turn to a detailed 
description of the data and of our general methodology.  
                                                  
5 Note that when we perform  a test of comparison of means, we never reject the hypothesis that both variables 
are higher in proportional systems with respect to majoritarian systems (at a 5% confidence level).   8 
As stated previously, our data have a panel structure. Given that we want to see the effect 
of electoral systems on human development through redistributive fiscal spending, we 
propose to use a two-stage least-squares methodology, correcting the standard errors for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity. Since the electoral variable we are interested in hardly 
changes over time, a fixed-effect regression is not suitable here. A random effect estimator 
would be of no use either, since our individuals are countries and it is difficult to believe in 
strict independence between exogenous variables and the permanent component of the error 
term. A between estimator is not suited either since some dummy variables change over 
time, and the period of observation differs a lot between countries
6. We must therefore use 
a pooled clustered regression.  
The cluster option is considered to control for the fact that observations are independent 
across countries, but not within countries. Given that the panel is unbalanced and we have 
no way of testing if the unobserved data are randomly missing, it might be argued that we 
award more importance to some countries than to others. As a robustness test, we decided 
to compare our results with a weighted regression where all observations are given the 
same importance. We arrived at similar conclusions. 
 
To test if electoral systems affect human development through transfer expenditures, the 
specification is rather easy. We should first check if electoral systems really affect transfer 
expenditures unequally, and then check if we find that higher transfer expenditures imply 
higher levels human development. Formally this can be done by running a system of 
equations of the type: 
 
                                                  































Where i indices countries and t time.  it HD  is the human development variable considered, 
it TR  the transfer expenditures,    it Z the matrix containing the variable identifying the 
electoral system (that is almost time invariant),   it W the matrix of the control variables for 
the explanation of transfer expenditures and   it G  the matrix containing the control variables 
for the explanation of human development;  .t I   the time dummies,  . i C   the regional 
dummies,  . i O   the colonial origin dummies.  a and  h  are the constants and 
11122122 ,,, bbbb , 1. i g , 2. i g , 1.t d , 2.t d , . i f the coefficients to be estimated.   and  ii en  are the error 
terms. 
The estimation technique is a two-stage least-squares, controlling for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity.  
In accordance with theoretical predictions, we expect the following results: first, ß11 should 
be strictly positive  given that, as  suggested by  Strauss and Thomas (1995),  transfer 
expenditures are supposed to improve human development, second  ß 21 should also be 
strictly positive given that, as suggested among others by Persson and Tabellini (1999), we 
expect that proportional  systems have a  stronger effect on transfer expenditures  than 
majoritarian ones (and we expect the effect to increase with the degree of proportionality), 
third, ß11* ß 21 should be strictly positive, i.e. we expect that the effect of proportional   10 
systems is positive on human development through its effect on redistributive spending. It 
is obvious that an electoral system has a meaning only in democracies. For this reason, the 
first thing to do is to identify a way of discriminating between democratic and non-
democratic regimes. For this, we rely on the famous POLITY IV democracy indicator 
(Jaggers and Marshall, 2000) and consider only countries that have a level of democracy 
higher than 0
7. Our dependent variable must be some human development indicator. We 
consider three such indicators that are generally accepted as adequate in the literature: the 
human development index calculated by the UNDP, the mortality rate and life expectancy. 
We describe these indicators below. Given that some of these human development 
indicators are only available every five years, for this analysis we will consider the period 
between 1975 and 1995 with five-year intervals. Removing all missing observations, we 
arrive at a sample of 261 observations in 59 democratic countries. Note that in order to test 
for the robustness of our results,  we check if our findings remain consistent  when we 
constrain our analysis only to highly democratic countries,  which we choose as those 
corresponding to a level of democracy above 5 in the POLITY IV index.  
As stated above, to measure Human Development (HDit), three indicators are considered. 
First, the human development index, created by the United Nations Development Program, 
is an aggregate index that measures the average level of a country taking into consideration 
three dimensions: life expectancy, the level of education (measured by the rate of education 
of adults) and the average income measured by GDP per capita. In several studies, this 
human development indicator has been criticized for not having a constant definition over 
time (note that for each year, the definition is the same for all countries). To correct for this 
                                                  
7 The indicator goes from -10 to 10, where 10 represent a totally democratic regime and -10 a dictatorship.   11 
in the empirical part, we remove the time effect and thus control for the difference in level 
due to those heterogeneous definitions. 
The second  indicator is the mortality rate that is often considered as a good proxy for 
human development. This variable indicates the number of deceased per 1000 inhabitants 
in  the considered population i.e. the  gross mortality rate = (number of d eceased/total 
population) x 1000. It is generally considered that this rate is high if it is above 30%, 
moderate if it is between 15 and 30% and low if it is below the 15%. This variable is 
available form the International Database of the US Bureau of Census. 
The third indicator used is life expectancy which is the average number of lived years for 
the entire population (life expectancy = aggregate number of lived years/population). This 
is also generally accepted as a good proxy for human development since it is highly 
correlated to the determinants of human development.  
As far as the independent variables are concerned, the first one, that we call transfers (TRit), 
is the l ogarithm of the social security and welfare spending, as a percentage of GDP, 
provided by the Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. 
The  electoral system (Zit), is calculated as the logarithm of the mean district magnitude 
(lnmdmh) as can be found in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) elaborated by the 
World Bank, since electoral specialists almost all agree that the principal determinant to 
translate votes into seats in parliamentarian elections, is the district magnitude
8. 
The control variables considered here are those commonly accepted as influencing transfer 
expenditures and/or human development i.e. the degree of openness (trade) as proposed by 
Verardi (2005), calculated as being the sum of exports and imports divided by the GDP, the 
percentage of people older than 65 as proposed by Deaton (1997), the Output gap (ygap) as 
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proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2003) measured as the logarithm of the deviation of the 
GDP with respect to the long-run path, the logarithm of the population to take into account 
the size of the country (lpop) and the primary school enrollment rate as proposed by Barro 
and Lee (1993) and finally the GDP per capita. In addition, dummy variables identifying 
each year, each world region and the colonial origin are considered to control  respectively 
for an eventual shock that may have  affected all the countries during a given year (or 
changes in the definition of a variable), differences in the level of transfer expenditures and 
human development in the different regions of the world and/or an eventual Anglo-Saxon 
effect as insinuated in Aghion et al. (2004). 
 
   13 
4. Main results 
 
As stated in the methodological section, we use a two-stage (weighted) pooled regression of 
the logarithm of the mean district magnitude on social security spending and of the latter on 
the three measures of human development described above. For the sake of clarity, we 
present all of the results of the second stage of the regression (top of Table II) while for the 
first stage (bottom of Table II) we only present the results associated to the variable we are 
interested in, i.e. the logarithm of the mean district magnitude (Log M. D. Magnitude). In 
neither of the stages do we  present the time specific effects that were estimated in the 
regressions. 
[INSERT TABLE II HERE] 
Analyzing the effect of the mean district magnitude on transfer expenditures (in the first 
stage), we see that in all  cases, doubling the degree of proportionality, in the sense 
explained above, implies an increase of about 30% of the spending in social security and 
welfare. This result confirms that there is indeed a close link between electoral systems and 
the breakdown of government expenditures. Now we also see that social security and 
welfare spending, as expected, increase human development. The effect is significantly 
different from zero and positive in all the regressions. This thus demonstrates that electoral 
systems have an indirect impact on human development through their effect on the 
breakdown of  government spending. To have an idea of the size of effect, we multiply the 
elasticity of social security spending with respect to the degree of proportionality (i.e. the 
coefficient b11) by the elasticity of human development with respect to social security 
spending (coefficient b12). The result for all the specifications is presented in Table II in the   14 
row labeled  1112 bb ￿ . The results are consistent with our predictions. If the district size 
doubles, the human development index  increases by 1.3%, the mortality rate decreases by 
almost 11% and life expectancy increases by almost 1% (and this for both sufficiently and 
highly democratic countries). Let us illustrate this by a simple theoretical example: consider 
a single member district (in other words, a pure majoritarian system). Doubling its size, i.e. 
going towards a two-member district would increase human development by 1.3 % which 
doesn't seem  much. But consider it moves to a 40 member district (as is the case in Brazil, 
for example), the increase in human development would be in the neighborhood of 50% 
which is of course quite a lot. This also means that changing a system just a little bit might 
not be very effective in increasing human development, while moving from a purely 
majoritarian to a purely proportional system might be much more efficient. 
5. Conclusion 
Human development is a concept that is gaining interest in the academic economic 
scientific literature. From the seminal work of Sen (1990), substantial interest has been 
clearly directed toward the topic, while it is becoming more and more accepted that human 
development is without any doubt a key concept to understand if a society is reaching its 
economic goals or not. Several causes for human underdevelopment have been considered 
in the literature. In this paper we try to understand if political institutions, in particular 
electoral systems, can be considered as playing a role in this matter as well. Our findings 
are promising: using simple econometric techniques and several definitions of human 
development we find strong evidence showing  that electoral systems affect human 
development through their effect on social security and welfare spending.    15 
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Table I: Average Human Development and Average Welfare Spending by Type of 
System 
 
  Variable  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995 
Social 
Security  7.46  8.60  9.51  8.43  10.51 
Proportional 
Human 
Development  0.73  0.76  0.78  0.79  0.81 
Social 
Security  4.75  4.80  4.96  4.43  4.83 
Majoritarian 
Human 
Development  0.66  0.73  0.71  0.75  0.75 
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Log Social Security 0.042***  -0.374*** 0.025***  0.043***  -0.380*** 0.027*** 
  (3.49)  (4.33)  (2.74)  (3.72)  (4.26)  (3.08) 
Log Population  -0.002  0.107***  0.001  -0.011  0.113**  -0.004 
  (0.26)  (3.28)  (0.13)  (1.33)  (2.66)  (0.72) 
GDP per capita  0.000***  -0.000*** 0.000**  0.000***  -0.000*** 0.000** 
  (4.90)  (3.92)  (2.09)  (4.78)  (3.81)  (2.02) 
Latin America  0.002  0.408**  -0.016  -0.011  0.370*  -0.019 
  (0.05)  (2.24)  (0.79)  (0.42)  (1.94)  (0.87) 
Asia  -0.004  -0.325  -0.036  0.050  -0.467  0.008 
  (0.07)  (1.20)  (0.96)  (0.95)  (1.39)  (0.19) 
Africa  -0.164**  0.496**  -0.128**  -0.165***  0.446**  -0.119** 
  (2.40)  (2.40)  (2.24)  (2.87)  (2.14)  (2.41) 
Openness  -0.000  0.002  -0.000  -0.001  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.79)  (1.56)  (0.11)  (1.42)  (1.29)  (0.64) 
Output Gap  0.011**  -0.008  0.000  0.010**  -0.008  -0.000 
  (2.53)  (0.64)  (0.22)  (2.52)  (0.56)  (0.20) 
School enrollment  0.006***  -0.003  0.002**  0.007***  -0.005  0.003*** 
  (4.67)  (0.80)  (2.25)  (5.87)  (0.99)  (2.81) 
Constant  -0.969***  2.626***  3.920***  -0.910***  2.747***  3.935*** 
   (5.44)  (3.31)  (27.01)  (4.88)  (2.93)  (24.31) 
Log Social Security 
Log M. D. 
Magnitude 
0.304***  0.291***  0.339***  0.280***  0.278***  0.340*** 
   (4.56)  (4.62)  (5.01)  (3.68)  (3.95)  (4.08) 
1112 bb ￿   0.013  -0.109  0.008  0.012  -0.106  0.009 
Observations  143  136  117  131  124  106 
R
2  0.89  0.84  0.77  0.90  0.84  0.79 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1: Human Development and Social Security Expenditures 
 
 
 